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Contributions to a Theoretical Framework 
for CSCL 
ABSTRACT 
Looking at computer support for collaborative learning (CSCL) 
in terms of (a) collaborative knowledge building, (b) group and 
personal perspectives, (c) mediation by artifacts and (d) micro-
analysis of conversation provides a rich, multi-dimensional 
starting point for conceptualizing and studying CSCL.  
The notion of collaborative knowledge building defines a useful 
paradigm for conceptualizing learning as social practice. The 
social interactions and knowledge management activities in 
which shared knowledge is constructed can be analyzed as the 
result of interweaving group and personal conversational 
perspectives. In general, collaborative interaction is mediated by 
artifacts: sometimes only by transitory artifacts like spoken 
words or gestures, but increasingly by physical or digital 
artifacts and media. Empirical studies of collaborative 
knowledge building employing micro-ethnographic analysis of 
speech, gesture, artifacts and media can make the details of these 
collaboration interactions visible, highlighting the interplay of 
perspectives and artifacts in the trans-personal construction of 
knowledge. 
A theoretical framework incorporating models of knowledge 
building, perspectives and artifacts – and grounded in empirical 
analysis of collaborative interaction – can guide the design of 
computer-based artifacts and media as support for collaborative 
learning with appropriate, elaborated and unified 
conceptualizations. 2       G. Stahl 
INTRODUCTION 
I would here like to introduce four themes that I have come to be 
convinced are important for thinking about computer support for 
collaborative learning (CSCL): 
a)  Collaborative knowledge building 
b)  Group and personal perspectives 
c)  Mediation by artifacts 
d)  Interaction analysis 
These themes have been developed in distinct academic literatures 
(e.g., education, psychology, activity theory and conversation analysis, 
respectively), but I believe they should be brought together for the kind 
of theoretical and methodological framework required by the complex 
and profoundly interdisciplinary field of CSCL. 
I will present these four themes in terms of hypotheses – or claims – 
that would have to be investigated further in the future: 
a)  The term “knowledge building” is more concrete and 
descriptive than “learning” when we are interested in 
collaboration. It may also help to avoid the baggage of 
individualistic epistemology in favor of a social practice 
view. 
b)  Collaborative knowledge building is structured by the 
intertwining of group and personal perspectives. One should 
neither ignore nor fixate upon the role of individual minds, 
but see them in interaction with group understandings. 
c)  The construction of knowledge proceeds on the basis of 
artifacts already at hand – including linguistic, cognitive, 
cultural, physical and digital artifacts – and creates new 
artifacts to formulate, embody, preserve and communicate 
new knowledge. 
d)  Naturally occurring and carefully captured examples of 
collaborative knowledge building – such as video recordings 
of classroom interactions – can be rigorously analyzed to 
make visible the knowledge building activities at work, the 
intertwining of perspectives and the mediating role of 
artifacts. 
To some extent, these four themes each fly in the face of 
conventional pedagogical wisdom – oriented toward mental contents of 
individual students – although they all have their respected advocates   Contributions to a Theoretical Framework for CSCL        3                      
as well. Within the limited confines of this paper, I cannot defend them 
against all contenders while also demonstrating their relevance and 
importance to CSCL. I shall just try to motivate how they could help to 
clarify the domain of CSCL. 
It should be noted at the outset that these are not intended as four 
independent theoretical claims; rather they contribute in a tightly 
interwoven way to a single framework or paradigm for thinking about 
CSCL. Collaborative knowledge building (theme a) moves away from 
approaches to learning focused on individual minds in two ways: first, 
by focusing on group activities, which necessarily include roles for 
individuals within the groups (theme b), and secondly by noting the 
importance of artifacts in the world, such as spoken, written or 
published texts that capture newly constructed knowledge (theme c). 
The evidence for these views can be found primarily in the kinds of 
micro-ethnographic studies of learning interactions that have recently 
become possible with the methods of conversation analysis using 
digital video (theme d). Conversely, when applied to CSCL such 
interaction analysis should be guided by (a) an interest in knowledge 
building activities, (b) an awareness of contrasting perspectives and (c) 
a focus on artifacts – without such guidance detracting from the 
intersubjective rigor of the analytic methodology. So the four themes 
shed light on one another and together represent an integral 
contribution to theory. 
One final point should perhaps be mentioned up front, rather than 
tacked onto the end as if in apology. That is, that the view of CSCL 
projected here is a visionary one. Collaborative knowledge building 
may be a way of life on the leading edge of scientific research, but it 
has proven devilishly hard to foster in contemporary school classrooms. 
The idea that new technologies will transform learning practices has 
not yet led to the collaborative ideal. The task of designing effective 
computer support along with appropriate pedagogy and social practices 
is simply much more complex than imagined. An explicit, elaborated, 
adopted and actualized theoretical framework is needed to (a) clarify 
the nature of collaborative knowledge building as a desired goal, (b) 
indicate how people can participate in it with concrete curricular 
approaches, (c) design tools to support it effectively in various contexts 
and (d) develop methods for observing and assessing it in practice. 
Let us look a bit closer at each of the four proposed contributions to 
CSCL theory. 
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A. COLLABORATIVE KNOWLEDGE BUILDING 
There are two troubling problems with the term “learning” if one wants 
to develop a theoretical framework for CSCL: 
•  Learning is everywhere; whenever someone engages in 
conscious activity, one can say that learning took place in 
someone’s mind. In fact, even non-conscious activity can 
reinforce tacit competences. 
•  Learning is never seen; only the consequences of learning 
can be observed, and they generally turn out to be 
statistically insignificant when one tries to be rigorous about 
this (Russell, 1999). This approach to evaluating learning is a 
hold-over from behaviorist measurement of changes due to 
operant conditioning (drill and practice). 
In contrast, the notion of “collaborative knowledge building” seems 
more tangible: 
•  It cannot simply be applied everywhere, but refers to 
specific, identifiable occurrences. Cases in which new 
knowledge is actually constructed by groups – rather than 
reified facts being recycled – are actually relatively rare in 
classrooms. 
•  With care and practice, one can directly and empirically 
observe the knowledge being built, because it necessarily 
takes place in observable media, like talking. Moreover, it 
produces knowledge objects or artifacts, which provide 
lasting evidence and a basis for evaluating the knowledge 
building. 
The term “knowledge building” is attributable to Scardamalia and 
Bereiter (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991), who have long advocated the 
restructuring of classrooms into knowledge building communities and 
who have spearheaded the development and testing of computer 
support for such communities (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1996).  
Their concept borrows explicitly from dominant forms of research in 
today’s scientific communities, where theories are progressively 
developed through professional discourse and inscription (Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979) – involving, for instance, peer review and critique of 
papers published in journals. Here, a scientific community learns about 
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documents that gradually define a path of inquiry and successively 
elaborate theory while also raising issues for future deeper 
investigation. Conflicting theoretical perspectives are essential to the 
process, as are the roles of specific participants. Discourse activities – 
such as questioning, proposing, arguing, critiquing, clarifying, 
negotiating, accusing, repairing, agreeing – are as important as the 
artifacts around which, through which and into which the discourse 
moves. 
Not all important learning is collaborative knowledge building. 
Bereiter (Bereiter, 2002) defines the latter in terms of the development 
of knowledge objects such as scientific concepts and theories. This 
does not include the learning of passed down facts, of practical or 
social skills, or of techniques of learning itself. However, social 
discourse about ideas – the core of knowledge building – can certainly 
motivate and exercise skills like reading, writing and thinking. 
The thrust of collaborative knowledge building is to emphasize the 
construction and further development of a knowledge object that is 
shared by the group or “community of learners.” The focus is not on 
personal learning by the participants, who, it is assumed, retain some of 
what the group discovered, deepen their collaboration skills and enjoy 
positive experiences of inquiry and intellectual engagement. 
Many models of curriculum design are compatible with 
collaborative knowledge building, and the elaboration of appropriate 
pedagogical practices remains an important area of active research. 
Progressive inquiry, for instance, dates back to analyses of problem 
solving by Dewey and Pierce. This has led us to an interrogative model 
of inquiry (Hakkarainen & Sintonen, 2001) based on an analysis of 
types of questioning according to the philosophy of science (e.g., 
Popper, Kuhn, Hintikka). A systematic approach to having groups of 
students pursue the posing and investigation of knowledge building 
questions is offered by problem-based learning, or PBL (Barrows, 
1994). This approach tries to cover the breadth of a domain (such as 
medical education) – in addition to the depth gained through 
explorative inquiry – by providing a carefully designed set of cases as 
problems to be pursued consecutively. 
PBL is thus a form of the case-based method (Collins & Stevens, 
1983), but one which requires the student group to become self-reliant 
investigators, with the teacher or tutor only facilitating the small-group 
process. More generally, PBL is a specific approach to project-based 
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learning (Blumenfeld et al., 1991), in which a group of students 
conducts a project. A potential issue with project-based activities that 
do not adhere to a model like PBL is that tasks often get divided up so 
that participants cooperate (as opposed to collaborate) on the over-all 
project but do not collaborate on the knowledge building; they may 
subsequently share their individual expertise through jig-sawing 
(Brown & Campione, 1994), but the basic knowledge building takes 
place outside the group interaction. 
For a theory of CSCL, we may want to focus on pedagogical 
approaches – like PBL – that center on group discussion as the core 
activity in inquiry. This discussion may take place verbally in face-to-
face meetings. However, for the sake of providing computer support 
(e.g., searching capabilities or customizable displays) as well as to 
maintain persistence of the discourse for subsequent review and 
reflection, significant parts of the discussions should be captured 
textually on the computer network – as typed minutes, chat streams or 
discussion threads. 
Because collaborative knowledge building necessarily involves the 
use in discourse of concepts whose meaning is continually changing 
and growing, a trained observer can (given the time and tools) observe 
how knowledge was built up step by step. Evidence exists in the 
interpretation of words, gestures and documents used. Because the 
knowledge was built by more than one participant, the changing 
understandings of the participants had to be shared with one another 
and may therefore be available to an outside observer as well. 
Roschelle (Roschelle, 1996), for example, has provided an exemplary 
demonstration of this for a pair of collaborating high school physics 
students. 
The characteristics of collaborative knowledge building just 
reviewed – that it is typical in modern science, that it is rarely achieved 
in classrooms, that it can effectively motivate other forms of learning 
and that it can be observed in practice – suggest that it might provide a 
useful pedagogical focus for CSCL. Of course, the main attraction of 
the notion of collaborative knowledge building is the hope that 
computer support can significantly increase the ability of groups of 
students to build concepts, ideas, theories and understandings together.   Contributions to a Theoretical Framework for CSCL        7                      
B. GROUP AND PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES 
After more than 2,500 years of knowledge building discourse about the 
nature of ideas and the meaning of meaning – dating back at least to the 
forum of Athens – we still find the concept of knowledge to be 
paradoxical and bewildering. However, two things seem clear: 
•  Wherever meaningful symbols, representations and artifacts 
may be found, they are only meaningful for individual 
minds. Interpretation is necessary, and that is necessarily 
carried out by individuals within the horizons of their 
personal perspectives (Gadamer, 1960/1988). 
•  Isolated from social interaction, physical artifacts and 
historical cultures, human brains are poor thinkers and could 
never have developed into powerful minds (Donald, 1991; 
Hutchins, 1996; Norman, 1993). In fact, it can be argued that 
modern minds are simply collections of cognitive artifacts 
internalized from inter-personal interactions (Vygotsky, 
1930/1978). The mental is primordially a social or group 
phenomenon. 
This means that anything like a theory of knowledge building must 
pay due regard and respect to essential roles of both collaborative 
groups and their individual members. 
The social basis of knowledge is deeply rooted. It is not just a matter 
of artifacts in the world extending the limited short-term memory of 
individual minds, like notes scattered about as external memory traces 
(Donald, 1991; Hutchins, 1996; Norman, 1993). Meaning arises in the 
historically given, social world. We are from the start situated in the 
shared, meaningful world into which we are born and with which we 
are engaged (Heidegger, 1927/1996). From the infant’s first inkling of 
intentionality in the mother’s gesture (Vygotsky, 1930/1978), to the 
moment of mutual human recognition (Hegel, 1807/1967; Mead, 
1934/1962), to the world-transforming paradigm shifts of expansive 
learning (Engeström, 1999), meaning springs from inter-personal 
interaction. 
The dilemma between personal and group perspectives plays itself 
out on the theoretical plane as a dialectic of hermeneutic and social-
cultural approaches. Hermeneutics, as the philosophy of interpretation, 
is concerned with how one can interpret the text of a distant author here 
and now. Heidegger’s foundational analysis of human existence as an 
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interpretive enterprise carried out on the basis of tacit, situated pre-
understanding (Heidegger, 1927/1996) appears at first sight to give 
priority to the individual as grantor of meaning. However, a closer 
reading (Stahl et al., 2002) shows that the individual is always 
essentially engaged in a shared world and that the network of meanings 
that define the individual’s situation are historically, culturally, socially 
defined. Thus, in his influential explication of Heideggerian 
hermeneutic philosophy, Gadamer (Gadamer, 1960/1988) argues that 
the possibility of understanding a distant text depends upon the author 
and interpreter sharing an historical horizon – one that includes the 
historical reception of the text itself. 
The analysis that Gadamer applies to communication across the 
centuries is relevant to face-to-face conversation as well. 
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) stresses that the meaning of a 
communicative context is established interactively and is achieved by 
the participants creating a social order “on the fly.” That is, the 
meaning of individual utterances is not given by some preconceived 
ideas represented in the speaker’s mind or from her personal 
perspective, which are then expressed and conveyed in verbal symbols. 
Rather, the meaning of the utterances is negotiated by the speaking and 
responding parties; it exists only in the group perspective that is formed 
by the intertwining of personal perspectives in the communicative 
interaction itself. The meaning of a specific utterance may be defined 
and affected by subsequent utterances, responses, gestures, pauses, 
repairs, etc. (Sacks, 1992). That is, the meaning of statements made by 
individuals is constructed or achieved in the discourse of the group and 
forms the interpretive horizon in which knowledge is shared during the 
moment of interaction – regardless of whether or not we choose to 
attribute individual learning to the participants in the long run. 
Discourse is the traditional medium of knowledge building. New 
ideas – and their interpretation by speakers and hearers – arise in the 
discourse in ways that transcend any individual’s role: 
The mark of a really successful design or problem-solving 
meeting is that something brilliant comes out of it that cannot be 
attributed to an individual or to a combination of individual 
contributions. It is an emergent, which means that if you look at a 
transcript of the meeting you can see the conceptual object taking 
shape but you cannot find it in the bits and pieces making up the 
discourse. (Bereiter, 2002)   Contributions to a Theoretical Framework for CSCL        9                      
Clearly, each word in the discourse can trivially be attributed to an 
individual speaker. However, the meaning of that word is defined by its 
position in the discourse context, that is, by its relationship to 
arbitrarily many other words (by other individuals as well as by the 
word’s speaker) and to the Gestalt meaning of the discourse as a whole, 
which is the group’s. 
In Roschelle’s (Roschelle, 1996) analysis of the physics students, for 
instance, their collaborative knowledge building coalesced in the 
phrase, “It pulls it.” Roschelle was able to show that the students 
understood this to mean that the fat arrow (representing acceleration in 
their computer simulation) caused a specific kind of change to the other 
arrow (representing velocity). Within the context of their computer 
model of Newtonian mechanics this change had a predictable effect 
upon the movement of a particle – and the students understood this. 
The statement “It pulls it” is an elliptical, indexical statement that has 
little meaning on its own as an isolated sentence. In the context in 
which the students were collaborating, however, it amounted to the 
discovery of the physics principle that acceleration is “the derivative of 
velocity with respect to time.” This latter way of stating it would not 
have made sense to these students, but only has meaning within the 
context of Newton’s theories of motion and calculus. The students’ 
statement made sense to them in terms of the components in their 
computer simulation, their experience with the simulation, their 
previous discussion and their general world-knowledge of pulling.  
When I analyzed a discourse among five middle school students and 
a teacher (Stahl & Sanusi, 2001; Stahl et al., 2002; Stahl, 2003), I was 
at first mystified by the cryptic interchanges in the transcript of a 
particularly intense and consequent collaborative moment. Within a 
matter of 30 seconds, the students exchanged 24 turns at speech, mostly 
consisting of sentence fragments or single words indicating 
disagreement or assent. It was clear that the students were intently 
engaged and shared a common understanding of what was taking place 
in the discourse: the resolution of a knotty problem for their 
collaborative inquiry and the achievement of a hard-fought consensus. 
But my retrospective interpretation of the transcript – which I 
developed in collaboration with experienced conversation analysts and 
others – required a careful reconstruction of the argumentation back 
several minutes as well as an understanding of the details of artifacts 
active in the knowledge building context. The meaning of a given 
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utterance was not a simple function of the words used, the prepositional 
content, the isolated speech act or even a conversational pair of 
utterances. Meaning was a shared, collaborative, interactive 
achievement. It was an ephemeral, rapidly evolving group perspective. 
Of course, in this analysis I was also able to track the personal 
perspective and personality of each participant. The flow of discussion 
as well as the individual conversational moves derived from the 
individuals in some sense as well. With different participants 
contributing from different personal perspectives, the discourse would 
have been completely different. And yet, the actual knowledge building 
that took place had “a mind of its own.” The group perspective, which 
unfolded and prevailed probably had more to do with the conceptual 
issues that were brought to the fore by the curriculum and by the 
artifacts which set the shared context and posed the problems to be 
discussed than with pre-existing ideas, intellectual orientations or 
personal values of the individual participants. So, while personal 
perspectives certainly contributed to the discourse and left observable 
traces there, the interaction achieved a group perspective that 
determined the meaning of individual contributions and within which 
knowledge was collaboratively built and comprehended. 
C. MEDIATION BY ARTIFACTS 
Knowledge building is mediated by artifacts. The interaction and 
interweaving of personal and group perspectives is mediated by 
artifacts. What does this mean? What is mediation and what are 
artifacts? 
“Mediation” means that something happens by means of, or through 
the involvement of, a mediating object. For instance, when a student 
uses a technical term to construct knowledge or when a class of 
students uses a software collaboration system to discuss a theme, that 
term or that system is mediating the activity: It is providing a medium 
or middle ground through which the students interact with their ideas. 
The specific form of the mediation generally affects the nature of the 
activity profoundly, often determining the nature of the task itself, that 
is, the choice of medium can define the ends or goal as well as the 
possible means. In Roschelle’s example, the metaphor of pulling 
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formulate a theory, to share their understanding of how the simulation 
worked, to bring their bodily skills to bear, and to solve some but not 
all of the challenges posed by the teacher. 
An artifact is a meaningful object created by people for specific 
uses. The term “pull” – as elaborated metaphorically by the students 
and as operationalized by them in manipulating the computer 
simulation of accelerating forces – functioned as a knowledge building 
artifact on several levels: It was a pre-understood concept that they 
could build upon, it provided a tool that they could use for collaborative 
thinking about the simulated phenomena and it resulted in a knowledge 
object that incorporated their new shared understanding. 
The concept of artifact is perhaps most familiar in anthropology, 
where it refers to discovered objects that were made by ancient people 
and that still display traces of their intended function or symbolic 
import. Hegel (Hegel, 1807/1967) spoke of artifacts as objects on 
which meaningful form had been imposed and he situated the 
primordial act of artifact creation in the interpersonal interaction in 
which people recognize each other and themselves as self-conscious 
actors. Marx (Marx, 1844/1967; Marx, 1867/1976) took the analysis of 
artifacts another step to argue that their character was largely 
determined by prevailing socio-economic relations, so that in our age 
most artifacts are produced as commodities for monetary exchange. For 
Hegel, artifacts retain the externalized subjectivity in physical form, 
and for Marx they retain both concrete human labor that went into 
producing them and the abstract value of the labor time they required. 
These classic analyses of mediation and artifacts are relevant to a 
contemporary CSCL theory. While theory is now a trans-disciplinary 
undertaking drawing upon multiple traditions in the social, human and 
natural sciences, the concepts of mediation and artifact can be traced 
back to the philosophy of Hegel, whose dialectical analyses revealed 
the mediated and historical dynamic everywhere. Marx critiqued 
idealist and subjectivist aspects of Hegel’s thought and grounded the 
mediations in concrete analyses of historically-specific social 
relationships. Contemporary theories prevalent in CSCL can be traced 
back to their roots in Hegel and Marx or later developments based on 
Vygotsky (e.g., activity theory), Heidegger (e.g., situated theory) or 
Dewey (e.g., inquiry theory). 
Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1930/1978, 1934/1986) wanted to supplement 
Marx’s social theory with a psychology of mediated cognition (a 
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perspective on the individual as intertwined with the group 
perspective). He extended the notion of physical artifact (tool) to 
encompass linguistic artifacts (symbols) as well. The individual’s 
activity was then seen to be mediated by both varieties of artifact. The 
human ability to use physical and linguistic artifacts is a cultural 
development that allowed mankind to evolve beyond its biological 
basis. 
Vygotsky argued – on the basis of empirical psychology 
experiments – that the meaning of artifacts and our understanding of 
that meaning are first created in inter-personal contexts, such as mother 
and child or teacher and student, and subsequently may be internalized 
in an individual mind. The discussion of learning in a student’s “zone 
of proximal development,” scaffolded by a teacher, is based on this. 
We can call the internalized result of this process a “cognitive artifact.” 
For instance, a work group might develop a list of tasks or a diagram of 
a work flow on a white board and a member of the group might then 
internalize and later mentally recall that list or diagram in order to 
monitor future work. The internal mental representation is then a 
cognitive artifact that resulted from group knowledge building and that 
may mediate subsequent knowledge building by the individual or the 
group. In this analysis, the mental representation is a result of 
collaborative activities and did not first arise subjectively to then be 
expressed externally. (The deconstruction of artifacts often shows that 
things developed in the opposite order from how they now appear – 
that is characteristic of the reification of meaning in an artifact.) 
A complete working out of Vygotsky’s approach could portray the 
human mind as nothing but a growing set of cognitive artifacts, 
internalized by each of us in our personal development from our 
interactions with those around us and our embeddedness in our cultural 
world. Vygotsky and others who investigate infant development have 
suggested how even the most basic senses of intentionality, meaning 
and intersubjectivity may arise in interpersonal interaction – as 
sketched by Hegel theoretically. The folk theories of mind – roundly 
criticized by Bereiter (Bereiter, 2002), Dennett (Dennett, 1991) and 
others – can be viewed as metaphors (mind as a container of ideas, a 
theater of experiences, a homunculus mind within the mind) which may 
have served their purpose but have now outlived their usefulness. 
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“society of mind” metaphor to capture the computational structure of 
mind as a decentralized set of cognitive artifacts. 
If we adopt a Vygotskian view of mediation by artifacts, then the 
knowledge building process can be conceptualized as the construction 
of knowledge artifacts, involving physical and symbolic artifacts as 
starting point, as medium and as product. The process proceeds 
collaboratively and intersubjectively, within a socio-cultural context. 
The final knowledge artifact may be internalized by one or more of the 
participants. While the internalized learning outcomes may be 
problematic to assess, the shared understanding within the collaborative 
knowledge building is experienced by the participants and may be 
subject to reconstruction from traces left in various artifacts, including 
video recordings and their transcripts. 
The task of education in this approach is to revive meanings that 
have been captured and preserved in artifacts. This is the problem of 
cultural transmission. Culture can be conceptualized as a body of 
cognitive and other artifacts. In literate society, for instance, culture 
includes systems of numbers and written language. Schooling is largely 
the attempt to help young students to internalize the vast repertoire of 
meaning that has been associated with these artifacts. Although it is 
often possible for individuals who have mastered certain skills 
(cognitive artifacts) to develop related knowledge artifacts on their 
own, it is at other times useful to recreate the intersubjective conditions 
of knowledge creation in carefully structured contexts of collaboration 
with well-designed mediational artifacts to scaffold further learning. 
Within CSCL efforts, this would mean designing software to support 
the right kinds of interpersonal interaction, of mediation by artifacts 
and of knowledge artifact construction. 
One does not have to buy Vygotsky’s whole approach as sketched 
out here in order to recognize the importance of an analysis of 
mediation and of artifacts for a theoretical framework for CSCL. 
Perhaps the most urgent undertaking at this time is further empirical 
investigation of how artifacts and their understanding actually function 
in concrete instances of collaborative knowledge building. For this we 
need a methodology of interaction analysis. 
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D. INTERACTION ANALYSIS 
Roschelle presented his analysis of two students working with a 
physics micro-world simulation as an instance of student learning as 
conceptual change, facilitated by collaborative use of a computer 
artifact. One could reconceptualize his analysis as an attempt by the 
students to rediscover the meaning or affordances that were designed 
into the software artifact as a model of physics. The term “pull” which 
they interpreted and developed in this connection was a linguistic 
artifact that they collaboratively constructed as a knowledge object and 
internalized as an expression of their learning. Roschelle used 
conversation analysis of video tapes as well as interviews of the 
students to conduct his study of the collaborative knowledge building 
and the internalized conceptual change. 
The question of how people rediscover meaning in artifacts is an 
important and difficult problem. When artifacts are created, their 
meaning is shared and relatively accessible. The artifact functions 
importantly to capture, formulate and encapsulate that meaning. But the 
meaning does not remain simply available on the surface of the artifact. 
As a note in the discussion database from my seminar on artifacts put 
it, 
Thoughts on meaning in artifacts by Bob Craig on Dec. 12, 2000 
Do artifacts “embody meaning” or do they embody meaningful 
traces of human activity? … Meaning is not “in” the artifact; 
rather it is “in” the total situation that includes artifacts, minds 
and social practices. 
The meaningful traces transform, reify, distort and hide the 
meanings that originally existed in the live human interactions. New 
minds who encounter the artifacts must recreate the appropriate social 
practices, reconstruct the cultural contexts and rediscover the meaning 
within their own personal and group perspectives. 
To investigate how people disclose the meaning of artifacts that they 
do not understand, I undertook an analysis of how the five middle 
school students referred to in Section B above struggled to uncover the 
structures designed into a rocket simulation. I started by trying to 
follow the students’ knowledge building discussion in a transcript of 
their discourse. But the most interesting and intense collaborative 
discussion was particularly hard to interpret. The student utterances did   Contributions to a Theoretical Framework for CSCL        15                      
not assume the explicit form of scientific propositions of articulate 
arguments. Nor could the conversational turns be coded as coherent 
speech acts (Searle, 1969). 
Here is the transcript of the pivotal moment of the three-hour long 
project with the rocket simulation: 
 
1:22:05    Brent    This one’s different 
:06    Jamie    Yeah, but it has same no… 
:07     (1.0  second  pause) 
:08    Chuck   … Pointy nose cone 
:09   Steven    Oh,  yeah 
:10    Chuck   But it’s not the same engine 
:11    Jamie    Yeah it is … 
:12    Brent    … Yes it is 
:13   Jamie     Compare two ‘n’ one 
:13   Brent     Number two 
:14   Chuck    I  know 
:15    Jamie    Are the same 
:16   Chuck    Oh 
 
These one-second utterances make little sense on their own. They 
are elliptical and indexical – like Rochelle’s “It pulls it.” By “elliptical” 
I mean that these are primarily sentence fragments, phrases that may 
complete or be 
completed by another 
student’s utterance, but 
do not stand on their 
own. They are 
fragments of a 
discussion that is only 
meaningful at the 
group level. By 
“indexical” or “deictic” 
I mean that they point 
to or intend something 
without explicitly 
stating their referent 
(“it,” “this one”). They 
index important 
Figure 1. Students discuss a computer 
simulation artifact. 
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elements of the shared situation that it would be redundant or 
superfluous to name. Where words and phrases are repeated, the 
repetitions play important roles of indicating agreement and shared 
understanding, which is also signified by the way utterances tend to 
complete each other. 
To understand what took place in this ten seconds, one must 
reconstruct the argument that reaches its climax here but that was set up 
in the previous ten minutes. (A theoretical foundation for this is given 
by Bakhtin (Bakhtin, 1986), who argues that an utterance is only 
meaningful in terms of its references back to preceding utterances to 
which it responds and forward to anticipated responses of a projected 
audience, and by Heidegger (Heidegger, 1927/1996), who situates 
meanings within the extended dimensions of human temporality – cf. 
Stahl (2002b).) One must also understand the task of the three-hour 
project and analyze the affordances of the software artifacts that the 
students are working with. (Activity theory, as formulated by 
Engeström (1999), proposes general structures of the broader effective 
context, including societal dimensions as well as the goals and tools of 
group activities.) In addition, it is necessary to observe closely the 
bodily orientations, gaze and gestures of the students. 
In Fig. 1, Brent (circled) thrusts his body forward and shifts the 
group’s focus to a rocket description on the monitor, about which he 
says “This one’s different.” The ensuing discussion debates what is the 
same and what is different about this rocket. The rocket to which “this 
one” is compared actually shifts here (“compare two ‘n’ one”), and that 
shift enlightens Chuck, who has resisted the teacher and the peer group, 
and has long tried to promote his personal perspective. Now, his “Oh” 
acknowledges a new-found acceptance of the group perspective. 
A detailed analysis of this transcript would make visible the 
knowledge building process that took place, in which the students 
displayed for each other verbally and non-verbally their shifting 
understandings and interactively achieved the creation of shared 
meaning. This meaning was partially encapsulated in terms like “same” 
and “different,” that took on specific functions in their collaboration. 
More generally, the elements of this kind of interaction analysis 
have been developed on a rigorous methodological basis by the theory 
of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and the science of conversation 
analysis (CA) (Sacks, 1992). With the availability of digital video to 
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interpersonal interaction, the CA approach has been combined with the 
study of gesture, gaze, bodily orientation, etc. into techniques for 
interpreting detailed behavior known as micro-ethnography (LeBaron 
& Streeck, 2000; Streeck, 1983). Most communication analysis in this 
tradition has studied pairs or small groups in face-to-face situations 
without technological mediation, although studies of telephone 
conversations played a major role in the early years of CA (Hopper, 
1992; Sacks, 1992). However, the foregoing observations on the rocket 
simulation discourse suggest that such methods can be applied to CSCL 
situations as well – with appropriate adaptation. If this is done, 
attention must be paid to the central mediational role of digital as well 
as linguistic artifacts. Also, in cases of collaborative knowledge 
building the unit of analysis for meanings should take into account the 
intertwining of personal and group perspectives by interpreting 
individual utterances as elements of the larger discourse and activity. 
CSCL FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
A theory for CSCL should help us to think about collaborative learning, 
to structure pedagogy, to design software media and to study actual 
occurrences of knowledge building inside and outside of classrooms. I 
think the four foundational themes discussed here start to address these 
needs. The notion of knowledge building focuses us on activities 
associated with knowledge management and the further development of 
theories. A concern with the intertwining of personal and group 
perspectives suggests curricular approaches and classroom practices 
that integrate individual and team efforts. The analysis of artifacts 
conceptualizes the roles of CSCL systems and their databases as 
mediators and preservers within processes of creating knowledge 
objects. Finally, interaction analysis allows one to view and assess the 
knowledge building activities, the intertwining of perspectives and the 
mediation by artifacts. 
The need for these four theoretical contributions arose for me in my 
work designing and deploying a CSCL software system named 
WebGuide (Stahl, 2000). This system prototyped knowledge creation 
and knowledge management functions that extended a conventional 
discussion forum. WebGuide investigated methods for intertwining 
notes in personal and group perspectives, that provided interlinked 
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organizations of shared ideas. The effort to reflect upon the nature of 
the WebGuide software I was designing led me to a view of it as a 
mediating artifact. Rather than trying to analyze the complex 
interactions of a class using WebGuide, I started by looking at how 
students learned about a simpler digital artifact, SimRocket (Stahl & 
Sanusi, 2001) – and that led me to a growing fascination with 
conversation analysis and micro-ethnography. I believe that the 
theoretical framework that emerged from my work on WebGuide will 
prove valuable in designing and deploying the next system I will be 
working on, BSCL (Leinonen et al., 2001). Perhaps it can help others as 
well. 
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